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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHAUNA F. HODGES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GIBSON PRODUCTS COMPANY, d/b/a 
GIBSON'S DISCOUNT CENTER, a 
Utah corporation, and CHAD 
CROSGROVE, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 20929 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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Defendants-Appellants Gibson Products Company, Inc.f herein-
after Gibson's, and Chad Crosgrove submit the following brief in 
reply to that filed by Plaintiff-Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ISSUE OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
WAS IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
This Court has once again reaffirmed its adherence to the "at-
will" doctrine, reserving only limited instances in which the doctrine 
does not apply. Rose v. Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 
May 13 (1986). None of the limited exceptions set forth in Rose apply 
in this case. 
The Court in Rose reiterated that an employer could not violate 
state or federal law or breach a contract when firing an employee 
and then escape liability. If neither of those circumstances exist, 
however, employment "is no more than an indefinite general hiring 
which is terminable at the will of either party." Bihlmaier v. 
Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979), at 792. Ms. Hodges has neither 
plead nor proved that either stated exception applies. The instruction 
given to the jury on the issue of wrongful discharge therefore was not 
a proper statement of Utah law and Defendants-Appellants were 
prejudiced by the trial court's submission of the issue to the jury. 
The policy behind the doctrine is sound and should again be 
upheld by this Court. The brief of Defendants-Appellants previously 
filed with the Court cites numerous cases which set out important 
considerations supporting the preservation of the "at will" doctrine. 
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Further, the jury's finding of "wrongful" discharge was unsup-
ported by the evidence presented at trial. The Defendants-Appellants 
in good faith believed that the accusations were true and that the 
employment relationship had been damaged as a result. This forms a 
reasonable basis for the firing and negates any "wrongful" motive 
on the part of Defendants. 
Because wrongful discharge is not a viable cause of action in 
Utah except under limited circumstances not present in this case and 
because Plaintiff-Respondent failed to establish that either of the 
Defendants-Appellants acted wrongfully, the jury's verdict should 
be set aside. 
POINT II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
REGARDING MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
The Plaintiff-Respondent failed to prove the necessary elements 
of a cause of action for malicious prosecution: that Defendants-
Appellants did not have probable cause for initiating the proceedings; 
that Defendants-Appellants acted primarily for a purpose other than 
bringing an offender to justice; and that the action was terminated 
in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent's argument in Point I of her brief 
relies on a premise which is not substantiated by the evidence: That 
Chad Crosgrove really committed the theft with which Ms. Hodges was 
charged and Defendants-Appellants knew that to be the case when 
presenting evidence to the prosecutor. From this assertion Plaintiff-
Respondent concludes that Defendants-Appellants did not have probable 
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cause to present evidence to the prosecutor and that they did not 
fully disclose all material facts concerning the loss. 
Defendants-Appellants, however, did have probable cause to 
suspect Plaintiff-Respondent of theft and to proceed with police 
investigation of the matter. At the time of meeting with the police, 
Defendants-Appellants presented the discrepancy discovered between 
the cash and register receipts, information concerning Ms. Hodges1 
access to the cash and receipts, and the register tapes and checking 
account deposit slip from Ms. Hodges1 personal account. This was all 
of the information available to Defendants-Respondents with regard 
to the loss. 
Additionally, Defendants-Appellants were relying upon the knowl-
edge and advice of the prosecutor to determine whether their evidence 
was sufficient to prosecute. There is no evidence that employees 
of Gibson's interfered with the decision to prosecute Ms. Hodges. 
It was up to the prosecutor to decide if further information was 
required or if he could proceed based upon the information at hand. 
This decision, if in error, should not create liability in these 
Defendants. 
Contrary to Plaintiff-Appellant's assertions, none of Defen-
dants' agents "directed" the prosecutor to dismiss the charges against 
Ms. Hodges. Mr. Dever, the prosecutor, elected not to proceed based 
on his judgment of the potential for obtaining a verdict against Ms. 
Hodges. (TR 112) 
The Defendants-Appellants were further prejudiced by the Court's 
erroneous direction to the jury that the dismissal of charges was a 
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resolution in Plaintiff's favor. Mr, Dever did not dismiss the 
charges against Ms, Hodges because he believed she was innocent, but 
because circumstances had made it difficult to present a case - his 
primary witness could not testify. 
Plaintiff-Respondent can sustain her cause of action for mali-
cious prosecution only by proving that Defendants-Appellants initi-
ated prosecution of Ms. Hodges for an improper purpose. Plaintiff-
Respondent's argument is based on the assumption that Chad Crosgrove 
committed the theft with which she was charged. It further assumes 
that Gibson's knew this to be the truth. Neither of Plaintiff-
Respondent's assumptions were substantiated by the evidence nor were 
they submitted to the jury for determination. Plaintiff-Respondent 
has failed to prove the necessary elements of her claim for malicious 
prosecution and the jury's verdict should be set aside. 
POINT III. THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
WAS ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
AND THE JURYVS AWARD OF SUCH DAMAGES IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In support of an award of punitive damages, Plaintiff-Respondent 
again relies upon the premise that Chad Crosgrove committed the theft 
with which she was charged without providing proof and without 
submitting that issue to the jury. The Plaintiff-Respondent did not 
prove that Defendants-Appellants acted maliciously, recklessly or 
with a knowing disregard of Ms. Hodges' rights. Rather, Defendants-
Appellants showed that their actions were prompted by a reasonable 
belief of Plaintiff-Respondent's guilt. 
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Even if Plaintiff-Respondent had proven Chad Crosgrove committed 
the theft for which she was prosecutedf which Defendants-Appellants 
denyf Crosgrove's acts could not be fairly imputed to Gibson's. Such 
acts would not be of benefit to Gibson's and give no basis for 
liability against Gibson's for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out in the brief and this reply brief of 
Defendants-Appellants, the jury's verdict in this case should be set 
aside. The issues of wrongful discharge and punitive damages were 
improperly submitted to the jury. Moreoverf the jury's findings on 
these issues as well as on the issues of malicious prosecution and 
special damages are not supported by the evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^ ~ day of September, 1986. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
P. ROBERT BAYLE? I 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellants 
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